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If we accept the conception of agency as a relationship in which one
holds in trust for and subject to the control of another a power to affect
certain legal relationships of that other, the distinction between pure
agency relationships and other powers of attorney is very clear. The
first can exist only where there is a fiduciary relationship and where the
holder of the power has a primary obligation to the one who created it.
So far as he acts for his own benefit in the exercise of the power, he
is acting adversely and not as agent. It is true that agents usually act
in order to benefit themselves but their privilege of benefiting themselves
is limited to securing this benefit as a result of acting for the benefit of
the principal.1
Because of this fiduciary obligation and because the agent holds his
power subject to the will of the principal, the power is revocable at any
time by the principal in spite of any contract made by the latter that it
shall not be, and, for the same reason, it terminates upon the death of
the principal.
The power which may be' called the proprietary power of attorney
has only the common element of power. The holder is not a fiduciary,
he does not hold at the will of the principal nor is he under obligation
to the latter. To-day the two powers have so little in common that, were
it not for their common origin and names, there would be no reason for
confusion.2
Both powers sprang from the common-law conception of agency, as
to which the evidence seems clear that the early law regarded the agent
as the physical holder and reproducer of the principal's mind. This may
be seen by an examination of the requirements.
Any human being could hold a power of agency, the individuality of
the actor being entirely disregarded. 3 The act to be performed had to
1For the discussion of this, see the article of which this is the continuation:
The Rationale of Agency (1920) 29 YALE LAw JouRNAL, 859.
'The classification of these as "quasi-agency" powers can be justified only by
the convenience of treating them in works upon agency. A full discussion is found




be done in the principal's name. Combes's Case4 applied not only to
formal engagements, but to all transactions: the agent for the purpose
of the transaction must, as the alter ego of the principal, adopt the
latter's name. For the same reason, we find one of the requirements
of ratification, which was thought of as creating authority a post, to be
that the act must have been done by one purporting to exercise authority
for another.5 Likewise the law was'clear that the agency must termi-
nate at death." With the submergence of identities, this result was
inevitable. And, finally, since the agent was thought to be one who was
expressing, not his own will, but the will of another, the principal's
assent to the transaction was at all times necessary. For this reason
the primitive liability of a master for all the acts of his agent was modi-
fied by medieval logic to liability only for commanded acts.7 For the
same general reason, the power of revocation existed at all times in the
principal.
But this early conception of agency had changed by the nineteenth
century, as the law had expanded beyond the old topic of master and
servant. In pure agency, changes may be noted. First, the rise of the
doctrine of undisclosed principal, and the. extension of agency through
trade, limited Combes's Case to specialties, and, in other cases, it was
'no longer necessary that the act should be done in the name of the princi-
pal." Secondly, the master became liable for uncommanded acts,
provided they were within the scope of employment, the law no longer
depending upon the identity of personalities, but creating obligations
because the employer was the instigator of the series of acts.9 And
finally, it has now become clear, by an analysis of the agency relation-
ship, that, while it is still possible for one not sui juris to exercise an
agency power, one not having capacity to assume fiduciary obligations
can not be an agent in the true sense.,
But the great departure from the first conception of agency was taken
very early, when powers of attorney were utilized to create a power,
similar in name, for the benefit of the holder. The conception of the
identity of principal and agent gave to English law an effective tool for
'(1613, St. Chain.) 9 Co. Rep. 75 "It was resolved, that when anyone has
authority, as attorney, to do any act, he ought to do it in his name who gives the
authority; for he appoints the attorney to be in his place, and to represent his
person."
'Keighley v. Durant [igoi, H. L.] A. C. 240.
8 "Livery of seizin may be made by the deputies or attornies of the parties.
But in the making of this care must be had.... (5) That it be done in the life
time of the parties." Shepard, Touchtone (1648) 217.
"Wigmore, Tortious Responsibility, 3 Select Essays Anglo-American Legal
History (9o9) 474, 495.
' Story, Agency (9th ed. 1882) sec. 154.
'See cases collected in Wambaugh, Cases on Agency (1896) 79.
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the prosecution of business which the Roman law never had. But this
was entirely destroyed when the courts of the twelfth century, adopting
the mnandatum in rem suam, used the power of attorney as a means by
which a personal claim could be transferred to another.10 To protect
the interests of the power-holder, it was necessary to make the power
irrevocable and at once there existed an alter ego not responding to the
will of the creator, an unthinkable situation. There was a power of
attorney in name, but not in fact."' The name was retained to avoid
the rule as to the non-assignability of choses in action. When these
powers were revived at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the
courts, after some hesitation, recognized them as creating an independ-
ent interest in the power-holder, gave him an indefeasable privilege of
suing in the name of the assignor, and made them non-terminable by the
latter's death. 12  These powers were used mostly for the assignment of
choses in action, but, in the eighteenth century, there arose a custom of
creating them for the purpose of giving back to the mortgagees some of
the control which the courts of equity had taken from them.'3 These,
"Ames, The Disseisin of Chattels (i8go) 3 HARv. L. REv. 337, 340.
Compare the following extracts: "An authority may be delegated by deed
indented, though the attorney be not party. to the deed, because the attorney takes
nothing by the deed, but has only a naked authority delegated to him." Bacon,
Abridgment (ed. 1842) tit Authority (A) . "Mere naked powers, which are to
be exercised for the exclusive benefit of the grantor, are revocable by him.
But it is otherwise where a power is to be exercised in aid of a right vested in
the grantee. .... For it then sounds in contract, and is coupled with an interest"
Story, J., in Dartmouth College v. Woodward (18ig, U. S.) 4 Wheat 518, 7oo.
"The same principle applies in every case where a mandate is granted as a condition
to the contract, or as a -means of executing it In such a case, the mandate,
forming an element of a synallagmatic contract, is impressed with the qualities of
such a contract, and is irrevocable." Fenner, J., in Renshaw v. Creditors (1888)
4o La. Ann. 37, 40, 3 So. 403, 405. "The power coupled with an interest thus
referred to is, however, a power conferring proprietary rights which .... is entirely
distinct from a power of agency, and the reference is therefore confusing, rather
than helpful." Tiffany, Real Property (ist ed. 19o3) sec. 279. "And it may
further still be said that, when reference is had to the nature of the delectus
personae doctrine .... that the grantor did not give the power to the corporation
under the influence of the delectus personae doctrine, but that power so to appoint
was purchased by the corporation as a part of the consideration named in the instru-
ment, to be irrevocably exercised by it" Calhoon, J., in Allen v. Alliance Trust
Co. (1904) 84 Miss. 319, 331, 36 So. 285, 287.
' Crouch v. Martin (17o7, Ch.) 2 Vern. 595. Nor does the death of the assignee
affect the assignment Hilliard v. Beattie (1894) 67 N. H. 571, 39 Atl. 897. For
a complete discussion of this see Cook, Alienability of Choses in Action (1916)
29 HARv. L. REv. 816.
'3 Jones, Mortgages (6th ed. 19o4) sec. 1765. In some jurisdictions these
powers were considered as powers operating under the statute of uses. Tiffany
doubts the soundness of this view. Real Property (192o ed.) sec. 656. If they
are to be regarded as distinct powers, there seems to be no insuperable objection
to considering them in this way. See Sugden, Powers (2d ed. 1845) *119.
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together with all other powers given upon consideration or as security,
were called powers coupled with an interest to differentiate them from
simple agency powers.14 They were held to be irrevocable by the
grantor and, after some doubt, the English courts held that all powers
of this sort were not affected by his death.
The first case in the United States raising the question of the termina-
tion of such a power by the death of the grantor was that of Bergen v.
Bennett'5 in which Chancellor Kent held that a power of sale in a mort-
gage was a "power coupled with an interest" and was not affected by
the death of the mortgagor. It was Hunt v. Rousmanier's Adminis-
trators,"" however, which proved to be the foundation of later American
cases.
In this case Rousmanier had given to Hunt a power of attorney to sell
vessels owned by Rousmanier, the power to be exercised upon default
in the repayment of a loan for which the power was given as security.
Upon a demurrer to a bill in equity, Marshall held that a power
of attorney is a power to act as the substitute of another. Such substi-
tute necessarily acts subject to the will and in the name of that other.
Therefore, the normal power of attorney ceases whenever the creator
wills and, since both the name and the will of a person ceases upon death,
the power terminates upon the death of the creator. Powers given for
consideration or as security may not be revoked by the creator, but, since
the acts must be performed in his name, they necessarily cease upon his
death. Powers, held by one who also holds a title or interest in the res,
do not terminate upon the death of the creator. To come within this
exception, the interest must be in the res itself and not in the proceeds.
"' "We think that it was not a simple authority to sell and surrender the premises,
but an authority coupled with an interest; for Forster was to apply the proceeds
in liquidation of a debt due to himself and partners." Lord Tenterden, in Gaussen
v. Morton (183o, K. B.) io Barn. & Cress. 731, 734. "What is meant by an
authority coupled with an interest is this. . . .that where an agreement is being
entered into on a sufficient consideration, whereby an authority is given for the
purpose of securing some benefit to the donee of the authority; such an authority
is irrevocable." Williams, J., in Clerk v. Laurie (1857, Exch. Ch.) 2 Hurl. &
Norm. 199, 2oo.
"5 (18o4, N. Y.) i Caines Cas. i.
"The case was first heard in the circuit court before Story, J., sub nor. Hunt v.
Ennis (1821, C. C. R. I.) 2 Mason, 244. Story here suggested an amendment to
include a statement that a lien had been intended which by error had not been
included in the formal instrument. A demurrer to the amended bill was sustained
on the ground that a mistake of law had been made against which equity would not
relieve. Ibid. 342. Story held that there being no "power coupled with an
interest," the power terminated with the death of Rousmanier. Upon this he was
sustained. (1823) 8 Wheat 174.. But the demurrer was overruled on the ground
that equity might afford relief to correct the mistake as stated in the petition. An
answer was substituted for the demurrer and Story again held for the respondent
in (1823, C. C. R. I.) 3 Mason, 294, being sustained in (1828, U. S.) I Pet x.
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A power to sell, given as security, but without a specific conveyance of
an interest, does not create an interest in the res.
The case is remarkable for the almost unanimous acceptance of its
reasoning by the American courts and for the avoidance of its effects
by many of them. It has become a tradition and, because of the great
names associated with it, will always be cited. But it has had far more
good fortune than it deserves. The authorities relied on were far from
conclusive; it has curious inconsistencies; and the result reached was
unfortunate both because justice was not done in the particular situation
and because it has caused great confusion.
The authorities cited were meagre. The statement of Coke and
Littleton,17 that, where a deed of feoffment is given with a power of
attorney to convey seisin, the power must be exercised during the life-
time of the grantor, represented the sixteenth-century idea of the iden-
tity of principal and agent with the necessary consequence that all
powers of agency must be exercised in the name of the "principal."
Combes's case had reference only to the normal agency and represented
the same view-point. In Shipman v. Thompson,' Fortescue, J., ruled
that the power to collect, held by a steward, terminated with the death
of the master, it not being "a power coupled with an interest." Here
again was a simple agency power. In Wynne v. Thomas,"0 it was held
that in a common recovery, the death of the vouchee, before the return
of the writ of summons, prevented the recovery. Willes, C. J., doubting
the irrevocability of the power of attorney given by the vouchee, held,
that, whether revocable or not, it did not permit the vouchee to be repre-
sented by attorney after her death. That a power of attorney is revoked
at law was held also at Nisi Prius in a case not cited, i. e. Watson v.
King,20 where trover was allowed for the sale of a ship by a power-
holder after the death of the owner. In neither of these cases was the
question raised as to the continuance of the power "in equity," the
means by which assignments were first made valid. In fact, authority
was almost lacking and Wilde, C. J., was justified in saying later that
"not much is to be found in the law books" upon it.21
As to Marshall's reasoning, there are several features which call for
notice. First, that his conception of agency was medieval in that he
considered the'agent to be in essence an extended will of the principal.
And although he spoke of irrevocable powers of attorney, he did not
see that an alter ego, not responding to the will of the one represented,
Coke, Littleton, *52b.
(1738, C. P.) Willes, io3.
"(1738, C. P.) Willes, 563.
(1815, N. P.) 4 Camp. 272.
'Smart v. Sandars (1848, C. P.) 5 C. B. 895, 916.
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was as inconceivable 'as an agent acting after death of the principal.
The central point in his argument was that the holder of the power
could not act in the name of a person deceased, which is correct only if
the identification theory is adopted.
2
Moreover Marshall apparently did not have a clear conception of the
great difference between the power of attorney and the testamentary
power, as to their operation.2 3  He seemed to think that the survival
of a testamentary power after the death of the donor was an exception
to the rule that a power without an interest terminates at the donor's
death. Of course it was not an exception, since, in powers drawing
their effects from the Statute of Wills or the Statute of Uses, there
never was such a rule.
Apparently because of this error, Marshall evolves the rule as to
powers of attorney that "a power not coupled with an interest termin-
ates with the death of the creator of the power." The familiar rule
in regard to testamentary powers had reference to the death of the
power-holder.24  In England the phrase as applied to powers of attor-
ney included such a proprietary power as existed in Hunt v. Rousmanier
which Marshall stated not to be a power coupled with an interest. And
in England the only square determination upon this, at the time of
Marshall's decision, was that even powers- coupled with an interest
terminated upon the death of the power-giver.2 5 There was,'therefore,
not a scintilla of authority for the creation of a distinction between irrev-
ocable powers with an interest and those without an interest.
Finally, in defining what an interest was, Marshall was unfortunate in
,= A number of American cases give this as a reason why an assignment of a
chose in action is not terminated by death while a power to collect without an
assignment is said to be terminated. Citizens State Bk. v. Tessman (1913) 121
Minn. 34, 14o N. W. 178. Of course this is not correct since, long before the real
party in interest could sue in his own name, assignments were unaffected by the
death of the assignor.
"In Hunt v. Rousnanier (1823, U. S.) 8 Wheat. 174, 2o6, Marshall says that
testamentary powers were held not terminated at the death of the donor because so
intended and because the courts treated them as devises. In fact they continued
because they operated as the designation of a use. A similar power granted
inter vivos is not affected by the death of the donor. If his argument has any
weight, it may be said that as to proprietary powers of attorney, if not made in
contemplation of death, they, like contracts, are intended to be executed, death
notwithstanding. A court should be as desirous of carrying out one's contracts as
one's devises. Story did not make this error in differentiation (2 Mason, 244,
25o), but the same confusion of thought is evident where cases dealing with the
two kinds of powers are cited indiscriminately (31-Cyc. 1043, note 41) and where
the court in dealing with testamentary powers cite Hunt v. Rousmanier, supra, as
in Dixon v. Dixon (1911) 85 Kan. 379, 116 Pac. 886.
"Robinson v. Allison (883) 74 Ala. 254; Osgood v. Franklin (1816, N. Y.)
2 John. Ch. i; Sugden, op. cit. *222.
"Watson v. King, supra note 20.
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his expressions, as a majority of courts since have appeared to be in
doubt as to his meaning.26 He states at page 204:
"The interest or title in the thing being vested in the person who gives
the power, remains in him, unless it be conveyed with the power, and
can pass out of him only by a regular act in his own name..... .If
the interest, or estate, passes with the power, and vests in the person by
whom the power is to be exercised, such person acts in his own name."
This seems to indicate that the poiver-holder must have a legal title,
and it has been so understood by some courts and text writers.2 7  But,
if one has a legal title, giving him in addition a power of sale does not
assist him at law, since he has already attached to his title a complete
power of disposition.28  If Marshall meant that the effect of this speci-
fically-granted power was to allow a court of equity to bar the equity of
redemption, it might well be asked why a court of equity might not
equally well direct a sale for the benefit of the one holding the equitable
interest. If Marshall meant to include in his word "interest," equitable
interests, as has been generally thought,2 9 the question arises whether
or not one who has an irrevocable power does not also have an interest.
" Thus in the following cases where the court was dealing with an agency
power, it cited Marshall for proof that the phrase "power coupled with an
interest" meant a contractual power similiar to that which Marshall said was not a
power coupled with an interest: Taylor v. Burns (19o6) 203 U. S. 120, 27
Sup. Ct 40; Forrest v. Smith (1919) 23 Ga. App. 290, 98 S. E. 224; Attrill v.
Patterson (1881) 58 Md. 226; Laux v. Hogl (1912) 45 Mont 445, 123 Pac. 949;
State v. McCafferty (19o9) 25 Okla. 2, 105 Pac. 992; Schilling v. Moore (1912)
34 Okla. 155, 125 Pac. 487; McKellop v. Dewitz (1914) 42 Okla. 220, 14o Pac.
1161; Gulf, etc. Ry. v. Miller (1899) 21 Tex. Civ. App. 609, 53 S. W. 709.
On the other hand, some courts have said by way of dictum that a power is
revocable unless it can be exercised in the name of the power-holder: Todd v.
Superior Ct. of Calif. (1919) 181 Calif. 406, 184 Pac. 684.
In cases where the court has been dealing with a contractual power, clearly not
within Marshall's definition of a power with an interest, it has been held that the
- power was irrevocable on the theory that it was a power coupled with an interest:
Chapnmn v. Bates (19oo) 61 N. J. Eq. 658, 47 Atl. 638; Cloe v. Rogers (1912)
31 Okla. 255, 121 Pac. 201; Bryan v. Ross (1919, Tex. Civ. App.) 214-S. W.
524.
,Citizens State Bk. v. Tessman (1913) 121 Minn. 34, 14o N. W. 178; Tiffany,
op. cit. sec. 318.
" "The power given by the principal is, under such circumstances, rather an
assent or agreement that the agent may transfer the property vested in him, free
from all equities of the principal, than strictly a power to transfer." Cassiday v.
MiKenzie (1842, Pa.) 4 Watts & Serg. 282, 285.
"Seymour v. Free (1868, U. S.) 8 Wall. 2o2; Bonner v. Cross County Rice
Co. (1914) 113 Ark. 54, 167 S. W. 8o; Chapman v. Bates (igoo) 61 N. J. Eq.
658, 47 Atl. 638. Some of the courts make a distinction as to real property, holding
that as to it, the power must be such that the holder can act in his own name in
the transfer. Frink v. Roe (1886) 70 Calif. 296, 11 Pac. 820; Dick v. Page (1852)
17 Mo. 234 (where the act of the power-holder is a link in the chain of title).
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Before considering this, however, Marshall's distinction between an
interest in the property and an interest in its proceeds, merits attention,
if for no other reason than that many subsequent cases have seemingly
turned upon the question: "Does the power-holder have an interest in
the property itself, or is his interest limited merely to the proceeds ?"
The distinction is valuable as determining whether one is being paid for
acting as agent.30 Moreover an interest in property may be very differ-
ent from an interest in the proceeds, in certain cases. For instance,
where one agrees to hold the proceeds of realty, when sold, on trust, the
interest in the proceeds can be distinguished from an interest in the land
and such trust ,does not come within the Statute of Frauds.31 But,
where there is not only an interest in the proceeds, but also an irrevocable
power of sale so that proceeds shall be assured, to say that there is not
an interest in the thing itself is to make a distinction of no practical
value.
In fact Hunt v. Rousmanier represents a bit of formalism by a court
which did not wish to press the logic of its reasoning to the fullest
extent.3 2 The older theory of a power of attorney had been outgrown;
the newer one was too revolutionary to be accepted in its entirety. The
following reasons may be suggested for allowing proprietdry powers to
exist after the death of the creator, at least so that the holders should be
able to derive a beneficial interest in the property over which the power
is held.
i. The intent of the parties is that they shall continue to exist, and
only in cases where there is some ground of public policy would the
intent of the parties be defeated. Aside from a few cases dealing with
powers of sale in a mortgage,3 3 there is nothing to indicate a hostility to
these powers by the courts.
2. There is no element involving personal relationship and only the
formal reasoning that the power can not be executed in the name of the
grantor is advanced. This same reason applies in the case of contracts,
for it takes legal interpretation to enforce against the administrator of
X a contract made by X. The reason for the termination of the original
agency power is dear; when the reason is absent, as here, the rule
should change. The question arises only in the case of the insolvency of
the power-giver, and, as the courts hold that the power does not termi-
"o Thus in Blackstone v. Butterinore (i866) 53 Pa. 266; Jacksonville Terminal
Co. v. Smith (1914) 67 Fla. io, 64 So. 354.
Mohn v. Mohn (1887) 12 Ind. 285, 13 N. E. 859.
"The whole reasoning of the court .... shows their anxiety to rid themselves
of the absurdity into which a strict adherence to the principle that death is a revo-
cation of the power, would have lead them." Rogers, J., in Cassiday v. McKenzie,
supra note 28 at p. 285.
'As in Lockett v. Hill (1874, C. C. N. D. Ga.) i Woods, 552.
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nate by his bankruptcy, there is no substantial reason why the power
should terminate upon his death.
3. But admitting that the power will terminate as a matter of law,
the question still remains as to whether it should not be kept alive "in
equity," not for the purpose of correcting a mistake of law, but because
equity should recognize that the holder of the power has a real interest
in the property and not a mere personal right.
The distinction between personal rights and property interests lies
chiefly in the transferability of the latter. Personal rights are non-
transferable, do not pass to an assignee in bankruptcy, and terminate at
death. On the other hand, the possessor of a property interest may
create in another an interest similar to that which he holds, it passes
upon his bankruptcy, and, save in the case of estates for life, it passes
to another upon his death. Where none of these incidents exist, we may
be sure that there is not a property interest. Thus the licensee 4 or the
holder of a common-law lien 35 was said to have merely a personal right.
In some of the cases we are on the border-land. Thus the right to enter
for condition broken and the possibility of reverter could descend but
could not be transferred.3 6 The right of an heir expectant can be
transferred "in equity" but does not pass upon bankruptcy.3 7 A
contingent remainder is not an estate but the holder has an interest
which he may transfer and which may pass upon his bankruptcy."'
The law has been very slow in the creation of property interests, but
there has been the same evolution, which Maine noticed in the change
from status to contract, in the change from personal rights to property
interests. Thus grants and leases of lands under the feudal system
created originally purely personal relationships.3 9 All choses in action
were personal relationships and many of them are still non-trans-
ferable. 40  Equitable rights, beginning as inhibitions placed upon per-
sonal action, continued to be thought of as rights in personam and it is
"' Thomas v. Sorrell (1673, C. P.) Vaughan, 330. It has been suggested that
there is an analogy between a license and a proprietary power as both are said to
terminate with death, even when paid for. But the analogy is far from perfect
since a license is revocable at will while contractual powers admittedly are not.
""A lien is a personal right, and cannot be transferred to another." Buller, J.,
in Daubigny v. Duval (1794, K. B.) 5 T. R. 6o4, 6o6.
'Rice v. Boston & Worcester Ry. (1866, Mass.) 12 Allen, 141.
'Bacon, Abridgment (ed. 1842) tit. Bankrupt, F; Industrial Finance Syndicate
v. Lind [1915, C. A.] 2 Ch. 345; Stover v. Eycleshimer (1865, N. Y.) 46 Barb. 84.
'Higden v. William-son (1731, Ch.) 3 P. Wins. 132; Clowe v. Seavey (1913)
2o8 N. Y. 496, lO2 N. E. 521; Martin v. Maxwell (i9io) 86 S. C. I, 67 S. E.
962.
"See Hargrave's Note to Coke, Littleton, *64a.
"Holdworth, History of the Treatment of Choses in Action (1920) 33
HARv. L. REv. 997; Gray, Restraints on Alienation (2d. ed. 1895) sec. 3. See
also 44 L. R. A. 177, note.
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only recently that the courts have acted on the hypothesis that the cestui
has an interest in the property itself. So a lien holder, at first having
a mere personal right of detention, has almost everywhere today, either
by statute or decision, an interest in the property commensurate with the
debt for which he holds the lien.
41
Perhaps the closest analogy to the proprietary power of attorney is
the general power operating under the statute of uses or the statute of
wills. Originally conceived as merely a power of direction of the
donor's will, it was thought to be only a personal capacity, capable of
being exercised by any one capable of doing the required act.
42  The
owner in fee of property, subject to the power, exhausted the whole
interest so that it was impossible for anyone else to have an interest. But
this logic, sufficiefit to overcome the difficulties of conveyancing, has
not been convincing in an age of commercialism which can not be alto-
gether convinced that the conjurer who produces rabbits from a hat did
not have in advance something more than a capacity for making
rabbits. Thus while the courts have been repeating that this power is
merely a capacity, we find them gradually recognizing in the power-
holder an interest in the property. Thus the donee is recognized as the
dominus and a trustee appointed by him may take possession from the
trustee appointed by the donor.43 So where the holder of a power
appoints by will to one deceased, the resulting trust goes to the heirs of
the appointer. 44  In the bankruptcy cases the courts have held, not only,
that if the donee exercised the power after bankruptcy, the assignee
might take the proceeds of the power,4 5 but also that the property may
be taken from a volunteer in whose favor the power had been exer-
cised. 46  To compel the power-holder to exercise the power in favor of
his creditors or to allow the courts to do this, as is done by modem
statutes,47 is but a step further, and his complete interest is clear.
4 A
'Nash v. Mosher (1838, N. Y.) 19 Wend. 431. Warren, Cases on Property
(1919) 3o3 and cases cited.
' Married women: Peacock v. Monk (750, Ch.) 2 Ves. Sen. 19o. Infants:
Re Cardross's Settlement (1878) L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 728. The courts have recog-
nized, however, the inconsistency of giving to one not sid juris complete disposition
over property. See Lord Hardwick in Hearle v. Greenbank (1749, Ch.) i Ves.
Sen. 298.
' Onslow v. Wallis (1849, Ch.) 3 Mac. & Gord. 5o6.
"In re Van Hagan (i88o, C. A.) L. R. 16 Ch. Div. x8.
'lit re Harvey's Estate (879) L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 216; Fleming v. Buchanan
(1853, Ch.) 3 De G. M. & G. 976.
4'See L. R. A. 1918 D, 346, note. For the English cases see: O'Grady v.
Wilmot [1916, H. L.] 2 A. C. 231; liz Re Wolstenholmne (1881, Ch.) 43 L. T. R.
(N. s.) 752.
47 (845). 7 & 8 Vict. c. 96, sec. ii; U. S. Comp. Sts. (1916) sec. 9654.
,' "The later Roman Jurisprudence, like our own, looked upon uncontrolled power
over property as equivalent to ownership," Maine, Ancient Law (Pollock's ed.
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similar situation arises upon insurance policies where the insured has a
complete power of disposition as to the beneficiary, and, here, the courts
recognize his property interest in it, which passes upon bankruptcy.4 9
In the same way the courts can hardly fail to recognize that the
holder of a proprietary power of attorney, irrevocable and not terminat-
ing by the bankruptcy of its creator, has an interest in the property. It
is certainly not true that the title-holder, who from day to day
holds his title subject to the will of the power-holder, has all the interest.
It is not different in principle from the case where one, having made a
contract for the sale of real property, holds the legal title subject to the
will of the other contracting party. In both cases the contract should
be enforced in equity, irrespective of death, in the one case by giving
specific performance, in the other, by allowing the property to be sold
under the power in the name of the administrator. It is similar to the
cases giving specific performance on a promise to mortgage or assign a
debt where the money has been advancd and bankruptcy intervenes. 0
19o6) 251, cited by Hogg, Why not Restate the English Law of Ownership of
Land (1921) 3o YALE LAW JouRNAL, 581. "A power equivalent to property,"
James, L. J., in re Van Hagan, supra note 44 at p. 33. "Considering that a
general power is for almost all purposes equivalent to property. . . .," Jessel,
M. R., in re Van Hagan, supra, at p. 32. "Giving one a general power is in fact
giving her an interest," Phipson v. Turner (1838, Ch.) 9 Sims. 227, 250. "The
very power to dispose of the remainder. . . .was practically equivalent to an
interest," Dixon v. Dixon (1911) 85 Kan. 379, 387, 116 Pac. 886, 889.
This power terminates with the death of the power-holder necessarily since the
exercise of his personal will, where there is no trust, is a condition, and in this
way it is different from proprietary powers of attorney, which have nothing
personal.
""Under such conditions to hold that there was nothing of property to vest in
the trustee would be to make an insurance policy a shelter for valuable assets. ..
McKenna, J., in Cohen v. Samuels (1917) 245 U. S. 50, 53, 38 Sup. Ct. 36, 37.
'An agreement to sell a debt is a good assignment "in equity". Heath v. Hall
(1812, C. P.) 4 Taunt. 326. An agreement to give a chattel mortgage is given
effect after bankruptcy. Triebert v. Burgess (1857) 1I Md. 452. The mortgage
of future-acquired goods operates as a contract giving the mortgagee power to
acquire title. If, before the goods come into existence the mortgagor becomes
bankrupt, as the mortgagee has not yet acquired an interest in the goods and as the
contract is terminated by bankruptcy, the mortgagee is not, of course, protected.
Collyer v. Isaacs (i881, C. A.) L. R. ig Ch. Div. 342.
In the case of the proprietary power there is an implied agreement that the
power shall remain. Thus, where the court was dealing with authority to fill in a
negotiable note: "It is not by an authority, but by a contract between the acceptor
and the intended drawer, that the drawer had a right to fill up the instrument.
You may call such a right an authority, but it is a right founded on a contract,
and being a contract it does not come to an end by the death of the acceptor."
Fry, L. J., in Carter v. White (883, C. A.) L. P. 25 Ch. Div. 666. "We all
know that the power of attorney, forming part of a security upon the assignment
of a chose in action, is not revocable by the grantor..... .For it then sounds
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It is within the rule laid down by White, J., in Walker v. Brown,".
"Every express executory agreement, whereby the contracting party
sufficiently indicates an intent to make some particular property,. . or
fund therein. .... identified, a security for debt,.. .or whereby the party
promises .... to transfer the property as security, creates an equitable
lien .
To this we may add the words of Haughton, J., in King v. Hanger,
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in holding that the goods of a man deceased were entitled to his personal
exemption from taxation; "the act of God shall not turn any man to a
prejudice."
That the courts have seen the equity of the situation and have
attempted to avoid the consequences of Marshall's opinion is seen by
an analysis of the cases. Some have definitely cast away the distinction
made between irrevocable powers and powers coupled with an interest.
Where the distinction has been maintained, it has been chiefly in the
case of real property. Most of the cases citing Hunt v. Rousmanier
are given below. There has been no attempt to cover all cases save
those dealing with the termination of the power by death, since the rules
in other cases are well-established.
First, the distinction between agency powers and proprietary
powers.5 3 The theory is simple but there are many cases close to the
line. In a few cases, the courts have made obvious errors, having per-
mitted the fact that the agent expended money in reliance upon the
continuance of his power, to blind them to the fact that there was a fidu-
ciary relationship with a primary obligation to subserve the interests of
the principal.5 4 But of course it is possible that even an agency agree-
ment shall be intended by the parties to give to the agent an indefeasible
interest in the property itself, making him a co-owner, so that thereafter
in contract." Story, J., in Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819, U. S.) 4
Wheat. 518, 700. In Hawley v. Smith (1873) 45 Ind. 183, the court held that
the contract remained but the power terminated, causing the estate of the deceased
power-giver to respond in damages for the breach of the contract, a result, it is
submitted, which cannot be justified.
(1897) 65 U. S. 654, 664, 17 Sup. Ct 453, 457.
(1615, K. B.) 3 Buls. 1, 18. In the same case Coke, C. J., says "It follows
then here in this case, that these wines are the goods of George Hanger, notwith-
standing he be dead."
' For a full discussion of the cases dealing with the distinction between proprie-
tary powers and agency powers see Mechem, Agency (2d ed. 1914) sec. 561,
et seq. For a succinct statement of the English law see Bowstead, Agency (6th
ed. 1919) art. 138.
"Forrest v. Smith (1919) 23 Ga. App. 290, 98 S. E. 224; Cloe v. Rogers
(1912) 31 Okla. 255, 12I Pac. 2oI; Gulf, etc. Ry. v. Miller (1899) 21 Tex. Civ.
App. 609, 53 S. W. 709.
PROPRIETARY POWERS OF ATTORNEY
he is working for his own interest and for that of the principal. An
agreement to allow a percentage for collection may be such an agree-
ment, if the evidence is sufficiently clear that the agent is to become a
co-owner at once. Upon substantially similar facts the same courts
have reached different results, as is inevitable where it is a question of
fact.5
If the agency relationship is found, of course, it is terminable at will,
although there was an agreement that it should not be terminated,
5 6 or
although the agent advanced money,5 7 or although it was expressed to
be not revocable.18  Although the agent had possession of the goods
and a lien, the power to act as agent is terminated in the same way,
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although of course the lien is not affected.60 Except for those held by
virtue of the lien,61 all powers of the agent are terminated at the princi-
pal's death and the only right of the agent to recover should be in
quasi-contract
9 2
Where there is a proprietary power, i. e. where the power was given
as security, or on a contract not of agency, for the benefit of the power-
'Thus in Hawley v. Smith (873) 45 Ind. 183, an agency only was found; in
Hitchens v. Ricketts (1861) 17 Ind. 625, an irrevocable power was found. In
efferies v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1884) 110 U. S. 305, 4 Sup. Ct. 8. and in
Seymour v. Freer (1868, U. S.) 8 Wall. 202, there was held to be an irrevocable
power, while in Missouri v. Walker (1888) 125 U. S. 339, 8 Sup. Ct 929 and in
Taylor v. Burns (i9o6) 203 U. S. 120, 27 Sup. Ct 40, there was found to be
an agency. See also Bonner v. Cross County Rice Co. (1914) 113 Ark. 54, 167
S. W. 8o.
"Walker v. Denison (1877) 86 Ill. 142; McGregor v. Gardner (1862) 14
Iowa, 326. But see contra, Bonney v. Smith (1856) 17 Ill. 531. Of course the
agent can recover for breach of contract. Durkee v. Gunn (1889) 41 Kan. 496,
21 Pac. 637.
" Smith v. Dare (1899) 89 Md. 47, 42 Atl. 909; Atlantic Coast Realty Co. v.
Townsehd (1919) 124 Va. 490, 98 S. E. 684.
' Todd v. Superior Court (I919) 181 Calif. 406, 184 Pac. 684 (where the
documents stated the power to be coupled with an interest) ; McGregor v. Gardner
(1862) 14 Iowa, 326.
" De Comas v. Prost (1865, P. C.) 3 Moore (N. s.) 158; Taplin v. Florence
(1851, C. P.) io C. B. 744; Frith v. Frith [i9o6, P. C.] A. C. 254; Laux v.
Hogl (1912) 45 Mont 445, 123 Pac. 949; Marfield v. Goodhue (1849) 3 N. Y.
62; Atlantic Coast Line Realty Co. v. Townsend, supra note 57.
"Smart v. Sandars (1848, C. P.) 5 C. B. 895; Marfield v. Goodhe, supra
note 59.
1 The power of the agent to indemnify himself does not terminate. Hess v.
Rat (884) 95 N. Y. 359. Here the court held the agent had a power to continue
to borrow shares, on a "short" transaction entered into for the principal.
"Fisher v. Southern, L., & T. Co. (1905) 138 N. C. 90, 50 S. E. 592. But see
Mills'v. Smith (19o6) 193 Mass. I1, 78 N. E. 765, holding that, where the agree-
ment provided the agency should continue after death, the estate of the deceased
principal was bound to re-employ.
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holder or of a third person, it is not revocable by the will of the power-
giver" ; nor is it affected by his bankruptcy, 64 or insanity.65
At this point unanimity ceases. The courts are not at all clear, save
in England, as to what constitutes a power coupled with an interest. As
previously indicated, in many cases the American courts have used
"power coupled with an interest" as meaning a contractual power.26
When a square determination as to the termination of the power by
death has been presented, there are a variety of holdings. Thus where a
legal title to real estate is given to a power-holder, it is everywhere held
that the title survives.6 7  Where there is a legal lien upon real property,
'Bromley v. Holland (1802, Ch.) 7 Ves. 3 (to collect annuity); Hodgson v.
Anderson (1825, K. B.) 3 Barn. & Cress. 842 (direction to banker to pay credi-
tor) ; Gaussen v. Morton (1830, K. B.) IO Barn. & Cress. 731 (to sell land) ;
Clerk v. Laurie (1857, Exch.) 2 Hurl. & Norm. i99 (direction to banker to pay
creditor); In re Hannan etc. Co. [1896, C. A.] 2 Ch. 643 (to subscribe for
shares) ; Pacific Coast Co. v. Anderson (igoi, C. C. A. 9th) 107 Fed. 973 (said
to be an equitable assignment) ; Allen v. Davis (1852) 13 Ark. 28 (to sell) ;
Marzion v. Pioche (857) 8 Calif. 522 (to sue, as security for debt) ; Smith v.
San Francisco & N. P. Ry. (1897) 115 Calif. 584, 47 Pac. 582 (to vote);
Ray v. Hemphill (1895) 97 Ga. 563, 25 S. E. 485; Kindig v. March (186o) 15
Ind. 248 (to confess judgment) ; Bonney v. Smith (1856) 17 Ill. 531 (to collect)
semble; Goodwin v. Bowden (1867) 54 Me. 424 (direction to debtor to pay
creditor); American Loan & T. Co. v. Billings (1894) 58 Minn. 187, 59 N. W.
998 (for benefit of creditors) ; Pardoe v. Merritt (1898) 75 Minn. 12, 77 N. W.
552 (to enter land on soldier's script) ; Buffalo Land Co. v. Strong (903) 91
Minn 84, 97 N. W. 575 (to convey land); Laux v. Hogl (1912) 45 Mont. 445,
123 Pac. 949 (to sell), semble; Chapman v. Bates (I9OO) 61 N. J. Eq. 658, 47
Atl. 638 (voting proxy and power to sell and exchange) ; Hey v. Dolphin (1895,
Sup. Ct.) 92 Hun. 230, 36 N. Y. Supp. 627 (voting agreement) ; Smyth v. Craig
(1841, Pa.) 3 Watts & Serg. 14 (agreement for arbitration as to price) ; Gulf,
etc. Ry. v. Miller (1899) 21 Tex. Civ. App. 609, 53 S. W. 709 (to collect);
Montague v. McCarrol (1897) 15 Utah, 318, 49 Pac. 418 (soldier's script);
Contra, Mansfield v. Mansfield (1827) 6-Conn. 559.
" Hutchinson v. Heyworth (1838, Q. B.) 9 Ad. & El. 375 (power to collect);
Walker v. Rostron (1842, Exch.) 9 M. & W. 411 (same); Stover v. Eycle-
sheimer (1865, N. Y.) 46 Barb. 84; Wood v. Kerkeslager (Igog) 225 Pa. 296,
74 Atl. 174.
'Powell v. Batchelor (915) 192 Mo. App. 67, 179 S. W. 751. See Davis v.
Lane (1839) I N. H. I56.
"See supra note 26.
"Hudgens v. Morrow (1886) 47 Ark. 515, 2 S. W. 104; More v. Calkins
(1892) 95 Calif. 435, 30 Pac. 583; Benneson v. Savage (1889) 131 Ill. 352, 22
N. E. 838; Berry v. Skinner (1869) 30 Md. 567; Conners v. Holland (1873)
113 Mass. 5o; Beatie v. Butler (1855) 21 Mo. 313; White v. Stephens (1883)
77 M o. 452; Durbrow v. Eppens (19oo) 65 N. J. L. IO, 46 Atl. 582; Carter v.
Slocomb (1898) 122'N. C. 475, 29 S. E. 720; Wilburn v. Spofford (1857, Tenn.)
4 Sneed, 698; Hodges v. Gill (1876, Tenn;) 9 Baxt. 378. Contra, as result of
statute, Texas Loan Agency v. Dingee (1903) 33 Tex. Civ. App. I18, 75 S. W.
866.
So on the death of one of two title-holders, the power survives in the other.
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it would seem that the existence of the lien should be held to create an
interest and make the power non-terminable.
6 s But some of the courts,
finding that the power of sale can not be exercised in the name of the
mortgagee, hold that the power terminates with the death of the mort-
gagor. 9 Where there is less than a lien, the courts have generally held
that the power does not survive, upon the ground that the power can
not be exercised in the name of a dead man.
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Where a power of sale has been given in regard to chattels, it has
been held that a transfer of possession causes the power not to termi-
nate.7 1  Other cases have held that, even where possession has not been
given, the power does not terminate.
72
In dealing with choses in action, it is everywhere held that, where an
assignment has been made, a power of attorney, given at the same time,
is not terminated by the death of the assignor.
7 3  Where the obligation
Gictman v. Buckler (1888) 69 Md. 7, 13 Atl. 635; Striker v. Daly (ii8) 223
N. Y. 468, 119 N. E. 882.
'The power is not terminated. Bergen v. Bennett (1804, N. Y.) i Caines
Cas. i; Frank v. Colonial & U. S. Mtg. Co. (19o5) 86 Miss. 103, 38 So. 340;
Muth v. Goddard (1903) 28 Mont. 237, 72 Pac. 621; Grandin v. Emmons (igoi)
io N. D. 223. 86 N. W. 723; Relly v. Phillips (1894) 4 S. D. 604, 57 N. W.
780 (where the sale is made and deed executed by the sheriff). See Jones,
Mortgages (6th ed. 1904) sec. 1792.
'Lockett v. Hill (1874, C. C. N. D. Ga.) i Woods, 552; Frink v. Roe (1886)
7o Calif. 296, 11 Pac. 82o, semble; Wilkins v. McGehee (i89i) 86 Ga. 764, 13
S. E. 84, overruling Colloway v. People's Bank (1875) 54 Ga. 441, and Roland v.
Coleman (1886) 76 Ga. 652; Johnson v. Johnson (1887) 27 S. C. 3o9, 3 S. E.
6o6.
" The power terminates Gartland v. Dunn (185) II Ark. 720; Frink v. Roe,
supra note 69, seinble; McGriff v. Porter (853) 5 Fla. 373; Jeffersonville
Assoc. v. Fisher (1856) 7 Ind. 699, semble; Bonney v. Smith (856) 17 Ill.
531, semble; Attrill v. Patterson (1881) 58 Md. 226, semble; Dick v. Page
(1852) 17 Mo. 234, semble (the Missouri rule is explicity limited to real
property) ; Davis v. Lane (1839) IO N. H. 156, semble; Wilburn v. Spofford,
supra note 67, senible; Hustin v. Cantril (1840, Va.) ii Leigh, 136, (based upon
a misunderstanding of Clayton v. Fawcett Adm'rs. (1830, Va.) 2 Leigh, 19.
The power does not terminate, Spooner v. Sandilands (1842, Ch.) i Y & Col.
390; Bonner v. Cross County Rice Co. (1914) 113 Ark. 54, 167 S. W. 80. See
also Glendening v. W. U. T. Co. (1914) 163 App. Div. 489, 148 N. Y. Supp. 552.
'Merry v. Lynch (1879) 68 Me. 94. This is in conformity to the rule in
testamentary powers that one having possession has sufficient interest to satisfy the
rule of survivorship. Eyre v. Countess of Shaftsbury (1722, Ch.) 2 P. Wms. 103.
" Gurnnell v. Gardner (1863, Ch.) 4 Giff. 626; American Loan & Tr. Co. v.
Billings (1894) 58 Minn. 187, 59 N. W. 998, semnble.
' Negotiable paper, Carter v. White (1883, C. A.) L. R. 25 Ch. Div. 666;
Moore v. Hall (1882) 48 Mich. 143, 1 N. W. 844; Citizens' State Bk. v. Tessman
(1913) 121 Minn. 34, 14o N. W. 178. Other obligations, Tucker v. Wilson
(1714, Ch.) I P. Wms. 261; Norton v. Whitehead (i8go) 84 Calif. 263, 24
Pac. 154; Kelly v. Bowerman (1897) 113 Mich. 446, 71 N. W. 836; Hilliard v.
Beattie (1894) 67 N. H. 571, 39 Atl. 897.
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is represented by a document and the possession of the document is
transferred, the same result is reached.74  Where a power is given with-
out either an assignment or a change in the possession of a document,
there is some conflict, but the tendency is to hold that the power is not
terminated.
7 5
" United States v. Cutts (1832, C. C. D. N. H.) i Sunin. 133; Renshaw v.
Creditors (1888) 4o La. Ann. 37, 3 So. 403; Merry v. Lynch (1878) 68 Me. 94;
Leavitt v. Fisher (1854, N. Y.) 4 Duer, I; Fraser v. Charleston (1878) I S. C.
486. See also Dickinson v. Bank (188o) 129 Mass. 279, holding that banrcruptcy
does not terminate the power.
" The power terminates. Gardner v. First Nat. Bk. (189o) IO Mont. 149, 25
Pac. 29; Houghtaling v. Marvin (1849, N. Y.) 7 Barb. 412, semble. In Leopard
v. Vernon (1813, Ch.) 2 Yes. & Bea. 51, the court apparently held to the same
effect, where the interest of the power-holder was not allowed to be shown.
The power does not terminate. Kiddill v. Farnell (1857, Ch.) 3 Sm. & Giff.
428 (power to convey stock) ; Hatch v. Searles (1854, Ch.) 2 Sm. & Giff. 147,
semble; Carter v. White, supra note 73, semble; Jeffries v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.
(1884) 110 U. S. 305, 4 Sup. Ct. 8 (power to collect given by an administrator.
The rule of Marshall would seem to be satisfied in this case since the name of the
administrator could be used in the action) ; Pacific Coast Co. v. Anderson (Igoi,
C. C. A. 9th) 107 Fed. 973 (given as- security) ; Shepard v. McNail (1907)
122 Mo. App. 418, 99 S. W. 494; Stevens v. Sessa (190P) 5o App. Div. 547, 64
N. Y. Supp. 28; Babrowsky v. U. S. G. L. of B. A. (19o8) i29 App. Div. 695,
113 N. Y. Supp. io8o; Keys' Estate (18go) 137 Pa. 565,:2o AtI. 710.
In the following cases as well as in most of the cases just cited, it was stated
that the power created an equitable assignment, which is universally held not to
terminate at the death of the assignor. Hutchinson v. Heyworth (1838, Q. B.)
9 Ad. & El. 375; Farmers' Bk. v. Kansas City Pub. Co. (1876, C. C. W. D. Mo.)
3 Dill. 287; Raymond v. Squire (1814, N. Y.) ii John. 47; Hurley v. Bendel'
(1896) 67 Minn. 41, 69 N. W. 477. In Cox v. Hughes (I909) IO Calif. App.
553, 102 Pac. 956, it was stated that the power was coupled with an interest.
In the following cases also the power was held not to terminate. Durbrow v.
Eppens (19oo) 65 N. J. L. IO, 46 AtI. 582 (power to manage a fund contributed
by a number of subscribers) ; Rogers v. Clark Iron Co. (19o8) 104 Minn. 198,
116 N. W. 739 (power to enter land); Hennessee v. Johnson (1896) 13 Tex.
Civ. App. 530, 36 S. W. 774 (same).
In the case of a power to confess judgment it has been held that the power
terminates with the death of the defendant (Gee v. Lane (1812, K. B.) 15 East,
592) ; although if the death occurs during the term, judgment may be entered as
of the first day. Fuller v. Jocely (73, K. B.) 2 Str. 882. It has always been
held that .the power terminates with the death of the power-holder. Cowie v.
Allaway (799, K. B.) 8 T. R. 257; Wild v. Sands (1727, K. B.) 2 Str. 718.
But where the power has been given to two, one of whom dies, it may be exercised
by the survivor. Todd v. Todd (1753, K. B.) Barnes, 48; Fendall v. May (1813,
K. B.) 2 M. & S. 76.
